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30 April 1953

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Chief, Plans and Operations, SR  
FROM: Chief, SR-3  
SUBJECT: AESAURUS Internal Program for 1954

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
SOURCE SMETHOOSE EXEMPTION 3B2B  
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT  
DATE 2007

Herewith are the memoranda you requested together with the recommendations of the Russian Branch and a few of my own thoughts.

1. I personally am not enthusiastic about embarking on an AKTIVIST Program this year. My reasons are these:

a. The security of the NTS operation is known to be weak at certain points. Yet all of our personnel are so involved in pushing the positive aspects of AESAURUS that we have little time to study the security aspects exhaustively and to start remedial action. I would like to increase our effort in this respect, yet in order to do so it seems that some personnel will have to be diverted from positive ops.

b. The "take" from AESAURUS has been meager by any standard when compared with the resources invested in it, i.e., 13 full time case officers and \$350,000.00 this year. I would like to see what the results of CACCOLA Cycle B are before expanding too much.

c. I seriously doubt the practicability of AKTIVIST work within the USSR at this time. In my opinion the rewards would be extremely meager in comparison with the effort involved.

d. Any control which we exert over the NTS is a very tenuous thing. They will continue to have their own program and it will not necessarily coincide with that of the U.S. As the NTS becomes more powerful this will probably become even more apparent.

e. Under present conditions, AESAURUS is a major effort of this division. Possibly it will be revealed within the next year that assets now being devoted to AESAURUS could be better used elsewhere. Even under existing conditions it would be very difficult to withdraw gracefully from AESAURUS. Additional commitments would involve us even more deeply.

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f. Our means of infiltration have been severely taxed this year. The prospects for increasing black infiltration capabilities are not bright. Therefore every additional commitment made to the NTS may force us to diminish our infiltration program elsewhere.

g. Since we are committed to moving the CACCOLA School to the U.S. we will carry this out as efficiently as possible. However, a rapid expansion in the size of the school coinciding with the movement would create many additional burdens.

2. Rather than to accept completely the AKTIVIST and black base proposals, I would prefer to maintain the CACCOLA Program at about the 1953 level for another year. This would not preclude discussions and general laying of groundwork for an expanded concept. But any further discussions should be undertaken only with the understanding that no new programs will be launched until the present program begins to pay off.


3. Just in case the 1953 cycle begins to pay off very rapidly, I would recommend the recruitment of three (3) or four (4) activist or black base types this year. My preference here would be to concentrate on the establishment of at least one (1) black base as a preliminary requisite to any AKTIVIST Program.

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4. Attachments:

1. EGMA-3272 dtd 2 Feb 53 (in dup w/1 Att.)
2. EGMA-4571 dtd 25 Mar 53 (w/1 att.)
3. Memo dtd 29 Apr 53, Subj: Rec. for 53-54  
CACCOLA Training & Operations
4. Chart "AESAUROS"

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
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REVOLUTIONARY WORK IN USSR

USSR

CIA-NTS




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1953-1954 CACCOLA TRAINING AND OPERATIONS

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
BASED ON ORIGINAL CARCASS PLAN-25 MARCH 1953

USSR



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CACCOLA-ACTIVIST  
TRAINING CONCEPT



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